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ABSTRACT 
We identify an important class of economic problems that arise naturally in several 
applications: the allocation of multiple resources when there are uncertainties in demand or supply, 
unresponsive supplies (no inventories and fixed capacities), and significant demand indivisibilities 
(rigidities). Examples of such problems include scheduling job shops, airports or super-computers , 
zero-inventory planning, and the allocation and pricing of NASA's planned Space Station. We show 
that the two most common organizations used to deal with this problem, markets and administrative 
procedures, can perform at very low efficiencies (60-65 percent efficiency in a seemingly robust 
example). Thus,  there is a need to design new mechanisms that more efficiently allocate resources in 
these environments. We develop and analyze two that arise naturally from auctions used in the 
allocation of single dimensional goods. These new mechanisms involve computer assisted 
coordination made possible by the existence of networked computers. Both mechanisms 
significantly improve on the performance of both administrative and market procedures .  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Short-run demand and supply imbalances are pervasive in markets and other organizations. 
The economic impact of these imbalances is exacerbated when the supply cannot be inventoried or 
quickly changed and when there are indivisibilities in demand so that it is impossible to react to the 
shocks. Indivisibilities imply that reactions by economic agents are not smooth, creating a 
coordination problem which becomes increasingly severe as the number of commodities increases. 
The combination of uncertainty, indivisibilities, and unresponsive supply creates an important 
economic allocation problem which is not amenable to standard methods of analysis. 
One example of this problem is found in airport scheduling and the allocation of 
takeoff/landing slots. Weather and mechanical failures create uncertainty. Indivisibilities in demand 
occur because the arrival or departure of a single airplane requires a fixed capacity for a slot, 
baggage handling, a gate, parking, etc. These capacities are not quickly adjusted. The method by 
which resources are allocated in this situation can have a significant effect on efficiency both through 
the direct allocation and the decisions of users of the system as to which aircraft to fly and when. 
Another example, which motivated the research we report here, is the planned earth-orbiting 
Space Station of NASA. The Station is to be an integrated facility providing a variety of services 
(e.g. data management, manpower, pressurized volume) to users over time. This will be a pioneer 
project with many new and untested technologies. 2 The performance of the Station and the resources
it will be able to supply to users will be subject to considerable uncertainty over its lifetime. On the 
demand side, users will design and develop payloads which will consume station resources in 
varying degrees of intensity. Once designed and built there is little scope for substitution. Thus, the 
overall Space Station allocation problem will involve the selection of users and the scheduling 
(manifesting) of discrete payload demands within the uncertain and unresponsive operating 
capacities of the system. The processes by which allocations are chosen will affect payload designs 
and the ultimate rewards from the use of the Space Station. 3 
Other examples include super-computer scheduling, natural gas pipeline networks, electric 
power grids, NASA's deep space network, job shop scheduling, and attempts to coordinate 
production schedules so that one is perpetually in a state of "zero inventories". Each involves 
uncertainty in demand or supply (usually correlated across commodities), indivisibilities in demand, 
unresponsive supply, and non-storable commodities. Some of these features are stronger in some 
examples than in others4 but all are potentially present, especially over short periods of time.
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Two generic fonns of economic organization have usually been brought to bear on this 
economic problem: markets and administrative procedures. With markets, property rights are 
defined, initial endowments assigned, and contingent contracts created and freely traded either 
through organized markets or in a more dispersed manner as in wholesale-retail relationships. Job 
shop scheduling in manufacturing is generally organized the latter way. With administrative 
procedures, an apparently more centralized method is created to solve the coordination and timing 
problems. Gas pipe-lines are regulated.5 Airports are managed through complex committees.6 The
Space Transportation System (sometimes called STS or The Space Shuttle) and its resources are 
allocated through a complex system of hierarchical committees and detailed administrative rules.7 
Every economist is trained to expect the inefficiencies, inherent in the centrally administered 
approach to allocation, which arise from differential information, inappropriate incentives, and the 
existence of veto groups. What may not be obvious to some is that, in the environments we have 
desc1ibed, markets can suffer similar inefficiencies. The technical reason is the existence of non­
convexities (optimal allocations cannot be supported as equilibria even with complete contingent 
contracts) which means that market clearing prices do not exist. The intuitive reason, obvious to 
most engineers, is that attempts at quick coordination across multiple dimensions through 
unconnected markets is not stable because feedback through prices and (random) rationing can be 
misleading. It may not even be possible to be good on average. Consider the following quote from 
Koopmans and Beckman (1957): 
"In the light of the practical and theoretical importance of indivisibilities, it may seem 
surprising that we possess so little in the way of successful formal analysis of production 
problems involving indivisible resources. However, the mathematical difficulties that 
arise in attempts to construct a general theory of allocation of indivisible resources have 
so far seemed quite formidable. Perhaps the best chance of progress lies in isolating for
detailed study a few limited but well defined problems, proceeding gradually from crude 
simplicity and artificiality to more realistic complexity." 
This quote retains its validity today and captures the spirit of our approach. In what follows 
we have focused on a "limited but well-defined problem" which is crudely simple but which we feel 
captures the phenomena we want to analyze. We examine the perfonnance of "well-defined but 
simple" versions of the economic organizations identified above as markets and administrative 
procedures and find them wanting. We then develop and design other organizations, adapted from 
known principles in single-dimension problems, which employ a form of computer assisted
coordination to significantly improve on that performance. We feel that one of these mechanisms 
strongly merits further study. 
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II. A SIMPLE ENVIRONMENT
It is fairly easy to describe the general structure of the class of problems we are interested in. 
It is easier, however, to understand the practical difficulties created for economic organization, in the
presence of multiple decision makers with differential information, through the use of an example. 
A simplistic but representative version of the economic problem arises in the allocation of STS 
resources. Agents from the private and public sectors design and build payloads such as commercial 
satellites or scientific experiments. These payloads are then integrated into a Shuttle which is 
launched into low earth orbit. Once in orbit, the payloads use resources supplied by the Shuttle, such 
as power and manpower, to successfully complete their missions. To keep the example simple, 
suppose there are two shuttles, A and B, to be launched on two dates, 1 and 2, where any particular 
launch may be delayed. Further, suppose each Shuttle provides resources y E Rf with a successful 
launch. [Included in K are available power and manpower on orbit as well as volume-in the 
Shuttle-and the mass that will be lifted.] The situation is summarized in Table 1 .  
A natural next modeling step would be to assign probabilities to the states and think of this 
as a random supply problem. But allocations cannot be made solely contingent on the state because 
at the time A launches on date 1 it is still unknown whether B will launch on date 2. It is necessary 
to explicitly consider the time structure in an event-tree. We have drawn this in Figure 1 where A= 
"A launches," B = "B launches," and N ="Launch Delayed". The states of the world as described in 
Table 1 remain as events 1 ,  2, 3, 4 and two additional events have been identified to recognize the 
effect of the timing of information. Allocations, supplies, and demands are specified contingent on 
events. Thus, supply is modeled as a function y : IE ---? Rf where IE = {l, . . . , 6}, 
y (1) =y (3) =y (5) =y, and y (2) =y (4) =y (6) =0. 
We assume the probability of any launch is common knowledge and represent the 
probability of an event e in IE as 11 ( e  ). For example, 11(1) is "the probability that B launches at time 
2 given that A launched at time 1 ." Thus, 11(1) + 11(2) = 1 ,  11(3) + 11(4) = 1 ,  and 11(5) + 11(6) = 1 .  
The demand side i s  almost as simple. A t  time 0, each agent i = 1 ,  ... , I picks a payload 
design a i from a set of possible designs A i . To minimize notation we will index designs by their 
resource requirements. Thus, A i �Rf. A (contingent) allocation to i is a vector 
x i  =<x i , ... , x �  > , where x j  e Rf is the allocation of resources to i to be delivered if and only if 
event e occurs. The utility i gets from the design-allocation vector (a i , x i ) is based on the 
assumption that i is a risk-neutral von-Neumann-Morgenstem expected utility maximizer whose 
preferences are quasi-linear in a commodity we will call money. Let 
Ui (a i , xi ) = Gi (a i ) [ 'Le eIE yi (a i , x j, e)] 
{ 11 ( e) if x j  ?. a i
where yi (a i , x ei , e) = 0 otherwise 
and G i (a i ) are the net benefits of the payload design a i if the launch is successful. If i pays b i for 
the contingent allocation xi with design a i , i attains an ex a nte expected utility at time 0 of
ui (a i , x i ) - b i . Finally, we require that x i  · x �  = 0 since a payload may launch only once.
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To summarize, the environment is given by the event-tree in Figure 1 ,  the supply function 
y (·), the design sets A i , the benefit functions Gi (a i ) , and the restrictions x i  · x �  = 0 for all i .  The 
uncertain and unresponsive supply is found in y O and '11 ('). Indivisibilities enter in two ways. First,
the constraint, that x i  · x �  = 0, is locational in nature (see Koopmans and Beckman (1957)) since i 
can consume only in event 1 or 5 but not both. This creates a non-convexity in the consumption 
sets. Second, once a i is chosen there is no flexibility and, thus, i demands only a single fixed 
amount in each market. This creates a threshold non-convexity in utility. 
To evaluate the performance of alternative institutions in this environment, we must use a 
performance target to identify those (contingent) allocations which are considered to be desirable. 
Our choice for a target is the set of ex a nte Pareto-optimal allocations. 8 That is, we consider the 
maximization of social value from a perspective prior to any realization of supply-at time 0, the top 
of Figure 1 .  Because all agents are assumed to have quasi-linear, risk-neutral utility functions and the 
same, correct objective beliefs about the probabilities of each event, ex a nte Pareto-optimal 
allocations are equivalent to solutions to the following mixed integer, non-linear programming 
problem; choose a ,  p, x to 
subject to 
L.f=1Pi ( e) a i :5:y ( e) V e 
pi (1) pi (5) = 0 Vi 
Vi , V e 
Vi , V e 
Vi . 
The allocation problem is to devise a method to find an optimal allocation when only i 
knows < A i , Gi O > .  
I f  a single agent possessed all the infmmation they could, i n  principle, solve this problem 
and compute the optimal contingent allocations. In practice this is a multiple knapsack problem 
whose complexity increases dramatically in the number of commodities and number of users. If the 
information is dispersed and knowledge is privately held by i then this information must be 
communicated in some way to the others so that the optimization problem can be solved. Further, 
this communication must occur prior to the realization of e . Economists now realize that, at the very 
least, this involves an incentive problem. For the environments we are most interested in we feel 
there is also a communication problem. It is not possible in practice (with bounded communications 
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systems) for any agent to communicate the full range of their possibilities A i or preferences Gi 
when there are multiple contingencies and multiple dimensions. One institution which economists 
normally expect to perform well under these conditions is markets. At worse the performance of 
markets provides a benchmark against which to measure other possibilities. As we will soon see, 
however, our simple example provides an apparently insurmountable challenge to at least one 
organized market institution. 
III. MARKETS
The first instinct of most economists would be that, since there are no externalities and a 
small number of states, one should be able to create enough contingent markets to efficiently allocate 
resources if there is enough depth to avoid non-competitive behavior. The analysis is simple and 
standard. Following methods introduced in Debreu (1959, ch. 7), one creates a market for each 
commodity at each node of the event-tree. A price Pk(e) is "a real number interpreted as the amount
paid initially by the agent who commits himself to accept delivery of that commodity" k if event e 
occurs. If e does not occur, no delivery takes place but the payment is still made. A competitive 
equilibrium is a vector of prices P * E Ji<E, where E is the number of events in IE, payload designs 
a *i , and event-contingent allocations x *i (e )1 for all e EIE, such that
and 
solves 
A. The Analysis 
It is easy to see that there are no externalities and that preferences satisfy local non-satiation 
(because "money" is infinitely divisible and always desired). Thus, the First Welfare Theorem [ 
Debreu (1959, ch. 5) ] implies that the competitive equilibrium allocation a *, x *( ·) is Pareto­
optimal. One is tempted to conclude that markets solve the problem. 
Unfortunately competitive equilib1ia may not exist. The reason is straight-fo1ward. The 
environment has a unique optimal allocation. By the Second Welfare Theorem [ Debreu (1959, ch. 
6) ] if there is enough convexity and continuity then there are prices such that this optimum is
(supportable as) a competitive equilibrium. But there are two fundamental non-convexities in the 
structure of our allocation problem, which prevent the application of this theorem. In fact, for most 
of the environments under consideration, the unique optimum cannot be supported as an equilibrium 
and, by the First Welfare Theorem, therefore there exists no equilibrium. Each of the two 
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troublesome non-convexities can be traced to a specific type of indivisibility. 
(1) There is a locational indivisibility. A payload can only be in shuttle A or B but not 
both, which creates a non-convexity in the consumption set. In a two-dimensional analogy one must 
be on the edges of the Edgeworth box. Interior allocations are not possible consumptions. This is 
exactly the type of indivisibility that Koopmans and Beckman (1957) identified and which has 
created problems for urban-regional economics. 
(2) There is a threshold indivisibility which exists because one must commit to a design 
before knowing the state of the world. The inability to adapt to the realizations of the random events 
means that, conditional on the design a i , one can only choose whether or not to participate, by
buying a i or by buying 0, at each event. This creates a non-convexity in the preferences of i (a
non-concavity in the utility function). 
Each non-convexity is potentially fatal in the sense that there are environments with each 
alone such that competitive equilibria do not exist. Both non-convexities together make 
non-existence virtually certain. But does this mean "markets won't work?" Not necessarily. For 
example, agents might use mixed strategies that "smooth out" the discontinuities created by the 
non-convexities and yield allocations that are good "on-average". One might not achieve 100 
percent efficiency but one might come close . It is possible to test this view theoretically but strategic 
issues become quickly confused with the competitive hypothesis. What is the appropriate 
"equilibrium price" if competitive equilibria do not exist? What is the game? Are there multiple 
prices for the same commodity? Institutional features normally abstracted from in competitive 
analysis can no longer be ignored.9 But development of the theory is not necessary for this paper. 
We tested the performance of markets in another way. We turn to that now. 
B. The Experiment 
To test the effectiveness of markets, we created an experimental environment for which 
competitive equilibrium does not exist and asked the Double Oral Auction to allocate resources. 
This is a market institution resembling organized commodities and stock markets, 10 which has
performed at 95-100 percent efficiency levels in past applications (see Smith (1982) or Plott (1982)) 
and which has become the experimental standard market mechanism. 
1. The Environment
The experimental environment is based on the example described in section II. In particular, 
the design involves two resources (X ,Y) in fixed supply, two dates (t = 1, t = 2) and two possible 
outcomes at each date, (g , n ). The quantity of the goods for time pe1iod 1 are available (g) with 
probability p1 and unavailable ( n) with probability (1 - p1). Either the total quantity is available or
no quantity is available for consumption. For time period 2 the probability of g is p2 and of n is
(1 - pz). p2 is independent of the time period 1 outcomes. Table 2 shows the exact parameters used 
to represent the supply side of the experiments. 
The demand side was created using monetary functions to induce value (see Smith (1976)). 
For subject i = 1, . . . , n values are induced by assigning to each a i E A i a monetary value of
Mi (a i ) .  If a subject has a von-Neumann-Morgenstern risk-neutral, utility function for money then,
by letting Gi (a i ) =Mi (a i ) ,  the induced values are identified with the model in Section II.11 In the
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experiments only discrete amounts were made available for the a choices.12 In particular, each
subject was given a 3 x 3 matrix of values corresponding to nine possible choices. If the 
mechanisms we are considering work well in this environment, they can easily be modified for 
operation in a more continuous demand structure. The actual valuation tables used in the 
experiments can be found in Appendix A. Subjects could only use the nine discrete choices 
available to them on the valuation sheets. We used six subjects per experiment. 
The specific parameters (payoffs and project sizes) chosen for the experiments required a 
computer search since the number of combinations that can fit within the available capacity limits 
and provide action in the market is sizable given six 3 x 3 matrices of choices. (A total of 90 
parameters must be picked.) The selection rule for the parameters in our design was quite 
subjective. 
As another way to provide a feel for the design, we calculated the distribution of the 
expected value of user benefits (the expected subject payments Mi) of a random selection of 30,000 
combinations of configurations which fit in the capacity constraints. The combinations were found 
as follows: first an individual valuation sheet i was selected at random (without replacement) and 
then one of its configurations (xi , Yi) was selected at random and placed in A . Next, another
individual valuation sheet was randomly selected without replacement along with one of its 
configurations. This was placed in A if there were room left, B if there were room left, otherwise it 
was discarded. This process continued until the set of available valuation sheets was exhausted. The 
expected value of L,iMi (ai) was then calculated and the selection process started over again.
If all subjects are risk-neutral then an ex ante Pareto-optimal allocation of resources is one 
that maximizes the expected value of L,iMi (ai). The allocation described in Table 3 is the unique
expected value maximizing use of resources and design choices. The expected value of the 
payments for an allocation as a percent of the maximum is a measure of the desirability of that 
allocation. We call this percent the (risk-neutral) efficiency level, and summarize the distribution of 
efficiency levels in Figure 2. Notice that the lowest possible efficiency level is in the 20--30 percent 
interval and that 85 percent of the distribution mass is between 40 percent and 75 percent. Hence, if 
we were to randomly allocate resources we should not be surprised to see efficiency levels in the 
range 40 percent-70 percent. Very few allocations, however, yield efficiency levels above 80 
percent. Even though the numbers used for the experiments are contrived they do provide a "hard" 
test for any mechanism designed to coordinate demands to allocate resources efficiently. 
2. The Institution
To test the efficiency of markets in the context of the non-convexities we have created, we 
gave subj ects the option of trading in any of six markets corresponding to the appropriate contingent 
commodities in non-zero supply. The markets are identified in Table 4. The capacity available in 
each market was divided among each of the six agents as an initial endowment which they could 
keep or sell. The specific initial allocation was chosen to minimize the efficiency level so we did not 
do any of the work the mechanism is supposed to do. For our experiments the initial allocation had 
an efficiency level of zero. The standard Double Oral Auction institution was used13 in which agents
can make bids or offers for any number of units in any market and can accept standing bids or offers 
for any number of units up to the number offered or requested. To be sure we gave this institution its 
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best chance to produce efficient allocations, we used subjects who were Caltech undergraduates and 
who were experienced in DOA experiments using the same PCs and software across 19 markets.
Further all subjects were given the same payoff tables and endowments in each trial. 
C. The Result 
The experimental data, some of which is displayed in Figure 3 and Table 7, shows that this 
environment was too much for the Double Oral Auction. Although efficiency reaches 80 percent 
(but not until period 7), the data suggest failure. The average efficiency is 66.4 percent with a range 
of [43,83.1]. Early periods are the worst. There are several reasons for this performance, traceable 
to the non-convexities, but the primary one seems to be the inability of the agents to decide which 
market they want to be involved in. There is no clear evidence of monopoly (or any other strategic) 
behavior, only of the inability of the markets to provide clear and predictable signals to coordinate 
the activities of the agents and allocate them to the appropriate markets. There seems to be no 
obvious way to adjust the market institution to yield higher efficiencies. This leaves open the 
question, can any other existing institution do better? 
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES
The first instinct of most engineers would be that some form of centralized project 
management would clearly provide the coordination needed to solve the problem. Administrative 
processes come in many forms but we will concentrate on the one we feel is not an unreasonable 
abstraction of NASA's STS pricing and allocation policy prior to the "Challenger disaster." That 
policy consisted of a posted price (which was zero for NASA sponsored payloads) and an allocation 
policy based on exogenous priority assignment and a first-come, first-served (which is essentially 
random) selection of available payloads. 
We consider the following mechanism. Agents pick their designs, ai, and submit a
resource-requirement vector xi . An "administrator" then selects from {x 1 , . . .  , x1} randomly
without replacement. At each draw the agent receives a contract for resources xi contingent on A 
launching if such a contract will not require more resources than are available if A launches. If it
would, they receive a contract for xi contingent on B if the contingent supply is still available. If
not they receive no contract. Thus contingent resources are assigned by a first-come first-served 
principle where the arrival time is not under the control of either the agents or the administrator. We 
call this mechanism the Administrative Process. 
A. The Analysis 
The mechanism is not designed to achieve efficient allocations. To see why, from a 
theoretical perspective, let us consider the allocations which result from Nash Equilibrium behavior 
in the game in which each agent picks his design xi, given the designs of others, to maximize his
expected utility where the unce1tainty includes that created by the process. 14 It is difficult to say
much in general about the characteristics of these equilibria, but we can say something fairly 
interesting for our specific example-the experimental design. For that specific environment, if 
agents 1 ,  . . . , 5 choose the design appropriate for maximum efficiency, see Table 3, and if agent 6
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chooses x 6 = (7, 11), then these choices constitute a Nash equilibrium for the game created by the
first-come, first-served mechanism. 15 Thus, it is possible in som e environments for this mechanism
to induce agents to select the correct designs if they can find the Nash-equilibrium. However, even if 
they do, the efficiency performance of the mechanism is still only 83 percent of the maximum. This 
is because the random selection process sometimes assigns agent 6 to shuttle A and sometimes agent
1 is rejected. Although efficient designs are selected, efficient allocations of resources are not 
made. 16 Presumably with inefficient designs, overall efficiency deteriorates even more.
B. The Experiment 
The real issue, of course, is to determine what might happen in practice. Can agents find 
good allocations? How does the mechanism perform? To answer these questions in a controlled 
experiment, we took the environment described in III B and now allocated resources using the 
Administrative Process. Subjects were told that there were two markets, each with capacity 
X = 20, Y = 20. A contract in market 1 corresponded to a contract to deliver contingent on states 1,
2 or 3 in Table 1. This type of contract is called a priority contract (see Chao and Wilson (1987) or
Harris and Raviv (1981)). Such a contract specifies the order in which resources are dispatched in 
case a curtailment is necessary when there is excess demand. There are many practical examples of 
this type of contract. A contract in market 2 corresponded to a contract to deliver contingent on state 
2 in Table 1, (a lower priority). Subjects could submit only one order consisting of an x and y
configuration and a preference ranking over markets 1 and 2. The orders were collected and 
randomly selected one at a time from a box and placed in the first market with capacity available in 
accordance with the stated preference rankings. When all the capacity or orders were exhausted a 
die was rolled. The orders in market 1 were filled if any of the numbers 1 through 5 appeared and 
the orders in market 2 were filled if the number 1 or 2 appeared. These probabilities are taken from 
Table 2 and were known by all participants prior to placing their orders. If a participant's order were 
filled she received the value associated with the configuration ordered. Since prices were not used to 
allocate resources, subjects did not need to pay anything. The process was repeated for a number of 
periods: subjects were allowed to change their orders between periods. 
C. The Result 
How does this Administrative Process perform? The answer seems to be, for the 
experimental environment we created, that this mechanism does no better and no worse than markets 
do. There appears to be no statistically significant difference in the average efficiencies achieved by 
either process. Further, their performance over time also appears to be identical. 
To see whether posting p1ices for priority contracts would improve the Administrative 
Process, we modified'the experimental institution in a way that parallels NASA's STS pricing 
policy. Prices for X and Y were posted and subjects were told that if they agreed to pay these prices,
they would be first to be allocated resources. After payers were allocated contracts, non-payers were 
then allocated contracts. Although policy makers do not have the information required to post 
"correct" prices, we decided to give posted-pricing its best shot by posting those prices which would 
lead subjects 1, 2, and 3 to choose their (efficient) payload designs in Table 3 if they treated prices as 
given. We let Px = 9 and Py = 10.
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What happened is not surprising. Although some subjects did pay in the initial periods, later 
all decided a free ride with a somewhat lower probability of inclusion was preferable to a costly ride 
with a higher probability of inclusion but a lower net return. In the end, posting prices had no effect. 
Periods 4 and 5 of AP/price are similar to periods 1-3 of AP. Performance is the same as if no price 
were posted. Total efficiencies are not statistically different. 
One must conclude that neither the administrative process nor markets perform very well in 
environments with uncertainty, unresponsive supply, and indivisibilities in demand. This leaves 
open the question, can a designed institution do better than the naturally evolved institutions have 
done? 
V. A VICKREY-GROVES MECHANISM 
It has been well known from mechanism theory that there exists an optimal mechanism
design for the environments in which we are interested when social efficiency is the performance 
standard. That mechanism, introduced by Vickrey (1961) and analyzed more generally by Groves 
(1973), is based on a modification of the 2nd price (or 1st rejected bid) auction for single­
dimensional problems. The key feature of this mechanism is that the price charged to any user is a 
function only of what the other participants bid. The mechanism asks each buyer to report their
entire willingness-to-pay (ex ante utility) function. The allocation is then selected to maximize the
sum of reported utilities. Each buyer i pays an amount equal to the difference between the total
utility the others would have gotten had i not participated and what they actually get, according to
their reported functions. Various lump-sum payments can also be levied. This creates the correct 
incentives (it is a dominant strategy) for participants to correctly reveal their willingness to pay for 
all contracts. Further, ex ante efficient allocations will result when participants use these (truthful)
dominant strategies. Given these facts, it would be natural to apply this Vickrey-Groves mechanism 
to our problem. There are, however, at least two characteristics of that mechanism which can create 
problems in applications. 
First, as Vickrey (1961) recognized, balancing payments is generally not possible. For 
public enterprises, such as the Space Station, this is not serious if, as we have modeled it, the supply 
decisions have already been made. As long as the government is interested in (short-run) efficiency 
and not monopoly revenue, one can ignore the budget-balance problem. After all, current policy 
which is similar to the Administrative Process suffers from the same failure. For private sector 
applications, balancing may be more important. Nevertheless, we were willing to ignore this 
difficulty. 17
We did not feel comfortable ignoring the second characteristic which, although not usually 
analyzed theoretically, is more critical for many applications. Vickrey-,Groves mechanisms require 
each bidder to report an entire payoff function, thus rendering the informational tractability of such a
mechanism problematic in most applications with environments characterized by multiple units and 
multiple dimensions. Not only is communication difficult but also much of the information required 
from an agent may not be readily available to that agent. Although any demander might be able to 
describe the benefits from any particular configuration of resources-given enough time, they 
usually know best only those configurations in a neighborhood of what they expect to receive. 18 To
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confront these informational realities, we decided to modify the standard Vickrey-Groves 
mechanism to require buyers to specify only one configuration and a willingness-to pay per report, a 
single demand point. Our intuition, based on others' research with iterative mechanisms, 19 was that
if prices at each iteration were consistent with the Vickrey-Groves logic, then with sufficient 
iterations information will be generated which would guide users to the efficient allocations in an 
"incentive-compatible" manner. 
A. The Analysis 
The new process which we call the Iterative Vickrey-Groves process (IVG) proceeds as a 
communication tatonnement until a particular stopping rule is applied. At each iteration 
t = 1, 2, . . .  , each i EN submits a "bid" (di , b i ,f ). di indicates the vector of resources requested,
b i is an amount i is willing to pay for di and f E IF describes the conditions under which delivery
occurs. We call/ the contract type and IF is considered part of the mechanism design. For example
one could let IF = {A , B } , where f =A means resources di are delivered if and only if A launches.
Or IF= {l, . .. , 6} where f = 3 means delivery if and only if event 3 in Figure 1 occurs.
Once the bids are received, individualized charges are computed as follows. For each/, 
define Nt as those users submitting a request for a contract of type f . Let
and 
r(f) = {YE Nt : 'L dj s;y} ,
jey 
Kt = arf!m ax ;:, b ff ,"(El'(/ ) j E "( 
Yi (j) = arf(m ax 'L b ff"(El'(/ ) j E "( iey 
st. Ldj + di :::;; y ,
j 
If the process were to stop at this iteration then i would pay 'Lt e IF pi (j ) if i E Kt and 0 otherwise.
To understand what pi is, one first notices that, for a contract of type f ,I'(j) identifies all feasible
coalitions; i.e., all groups of users whose collective bids are feasible, while Kt selects the coalition
with the maximum sum of bids. If i E Kt then Yi (j) is simply Kt - {i }, while if i �Kt then Yi (j)
identifies the coalition in I'(j) which 1) would remain feasible if i were added, and 2) maximizes
the sum of bids of its members. Thus, joining with Yi (j) is i 's "best chance" of acquiring a contract
of type f , given the behavior of the other participants. Given a vector d of resource demands, the
"price" Pi (j) that trader i faces for contract f is equal to either the social cost of i being in Kt in
terms of revenue foregone by i 's inclusion, or the minimum amount b i needed to become a member
of K1 holding other traders' bids constant. In the former, the first term on the RHS of the price
equation is the amount generated if i did not participate; subtracting off the bids by other members
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of K1 gives an equivalent version of the Vickrey-Groves "second price" auction of a single unit of a
good. Given d and assuming risk neutrality, bidding one's expected value for a contract is a
dominant strategy. In the latter, the first term is simply the sum of bids of the members of K1 , thus
subtracting off the bids of i's "best chance" coalition gives the amount i would have had to have bid 
to have been allocated resources in f . 
Before proceeding to the next iteration each i observes {pi (j)} as well as d. Thus, at each
trial, the participants gain information concerning not only the demand for resources and contracts 
that they (provisionally) acquire, but also for those which they do not. In this way, as the iterations 
proceed and bidders search for their "best" alternative, the mechanism may lead to an efficient 
outcome if participants adopt the "short-run" dominant strategy of bidding their true value. 
The process stops at t if K1 at t is the same as K1 at t - l,'iJ' f e/F. That is, the process
stops when some sort of stability has been reached wherein the set of participants acquiring 
resources for each contract type remains unchanged. It is relatively easy to see that if users bid their 
true expected value for (di , f )  then this mechanism will select the efficient combination of uses, K1, 
given the requested di . It is not at all obvious, however, how a user either should or would select di 
and f . Inefficient designs might occur. Nevertheless it was our expectation that this process would 
improve on the Administrative Process, described in Section IV, since the Iterative Vickrey-Groves 
process at least selects efficient combinations of configurations even if those configurations may not 
be fully optimal. 
B. The Experiment 
The determination of allocations and the calculation of individual prices for this mechanism 
is an enormous task which cannot be done by hand in an effective manner. Thus, for testing this 
mechanism, all communication and calculations were made using a network of personal computers 
(PCs). The PCs were connected on a local area network with a controller PC being the center where 
messages were received, prices were calculated, allocations were determined, and from which 
messages were sent. 
At the beginning of a trial in a market period an individual would submit a configuration a i 
and select a priority, either market 1 or market 2 (but not both markets). As in the Administrative 
Process, market 1 corresponds to the priority contract-deliver contingent on states 1, 2 and 3, while 
market 2 corresponds to the contract-deliver contingent on state 2. The subject would then enter a 
bid for the configuration. After each individual sent his message to the center it calculated the 
provisional allocation and prices for each participant. Each individual user was then informed of the 
provisional traders in each contract and of their configurations, based on the trial messages. In 
addition, each subject received a private price message which described their potential payment if 
they were part of the provisional allocation, or (if they were not) the amount they would have had to 
bid in order to have had their configuration included in the provisional allocation. The algorithm 
used to calculate allocations and prices and to return this information to subjects took less than one 
second to transmit after the last message was entered. Furthermore, each subject had displayed on 
their screen the history of the last three trials including provisional allocations and prices. 
The stopping rule for allocating the contracts was partially sequential. In particular, the 
process stopped if the same subjects and configurations occurred in the markets three times in a row 
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(rule A). Otherwise, market 1 closed after t1 trials were exhausted; market 2 closed after t2 trials if
rule A were not executed, where t 2 > t 1. 
The only restrictions on the individuals' messages were that b i > 0 ( and integer valued) for
each trial, the a i must be one of i 's nine choices, and a subject could submit a bid for market 1 or
market 2, but not both markets in the same trial. There was no ratchet (improvement) rule for
individual bids in the process. Thus, a bid was not necessarily binding because one can bid "very 
high" in trial t and then bid almost zero in trial t + 1 .  We chose this set of rules to allow individuals
to "easily" search for combinations. 20 The instructions for this experiment can be found in Appendix
B.  
C.  The Result 
The Iterative Vickrey-Groves mechanism yielded higher efficiency levels than either 
Markets or the Administrative Process. The IVG attained a mean efficiency of 78 percent with a 
range of [ 60, 9 1 ], a significant increase from 64 percent. Particularly of interest, was the fact that
IVG dominated both Markets and the Administrative Process on a period by period basis: IVG 
attained high efficiencies early and maintained them. 
Unfortunately, an efficiency of 100 percent was not achieved. In fact IVG did not even
produce stable levels of efficiency, dipping as low as 60 percent (easily obtainable at random). One
explanation for this instability is the fact that the process was pushed to the final trial in many cases 
which led the final bid for d i to be somewhat random. Coordination across user designs is lacking.
Even though one trial produced an efficiency level of 90 percent, the reliability of the process is
suspicious. 21 More details of performance are provided below in Section VIL
VI. AN ASCENDING BID AUCTION
Feeling unhappy with the complexity of the rules for pricing in the Iterative Vickrey-Groves 
mechanism, but feeling that iteration would be helpful if more coordination were evident and if some 
form of commitment to designs were required, we designed a mechanism by modifying the English 
(or ascending-bid) auction commonly used to sell art objects, livestock, and tobacco. (See Cox, 
Roberson and Smith ( 1982) or Milgrom and Weber (1982) for descriptions and analyses of
ascending bid auctions). We call our version the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM)­
Bulletin Board. AUSM does not require all participants to be in the same room (as in Sotheby's art
auction); they can communicate "bids" through an electronic bulletin board. Nor does it require a 
rapid sequence of bids to be made (as in the art auction); participants can be allowed any length of 
time thought to be desirable to consider their demands. AUSM is not a spot market and requires no 
auctioneer. It is a decentralized mechanism which.guides coordination in.design and which selects 
high yield projects. 
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A. The Analysis 
The English auction, upon which AUSM is based, is a non-tatonnement process that is 
commonly and widely used to auction single items of uncertain value to multiple bidders. At each 
instant during this type of auction there is a potential allocation, which is common knowledge. Any 
agent can enter a bid at any time. The bid is common knowledge. There is a common update rule 
which specifies how a new bid can create a new potential allocation. The process stops when no new 
bid is made soon enough after the last bid. The potential allocation is then the actual allocation. 
For auctions of single items the potential allocation is usually expressed as "the item goes to 
the current highest bidder who will pay his bid," and a bid is "a stated willingness to pay." The 
update rule is that the person bidding becomes "the current highest bidder at that bid" if their bid is 
higher than that of the current highest bidder. If not, no change occurs. 
For multiple contracts of multiple dimensions, the principle is exactly the same. There is a 
supply of each of IF contracts to be allocated. The capacity of each is y E �. [We can easily modify
this to accommodate an environment in which y depends on f E IF ] . For our experimental 
environment, IF = { 1, 2}(the priority contracts), and YER;. A potential allocation is a feasible
collection of contracts. A bid is simply a proposed contract (di , bi, f ). A bid replaces a contract 
(or group of contracts) in the potential allocation if and only if the bi is higher than the sum of the
bids offered by those being replaced. More formally, letK1 be the agents who hold contracts in the 
current potential allocation off and let R �Kt. If z1 + !: d j '2:. di and bi '2:. !: bj where jeR jeR 
z1 = y - !: dw , then (di , bi ,f) replaces the collection { ( cj , b j ,f )} j e R . If there is no such R
weK1 
then the new allocation equals the old (i.e. , i's bid is rejected). If there are more than one such R,  
we assume that i replaces the R with the smallest value of!:jeRb j.
The potential allocation can be publicly displayed on a (computerized) Bulletin Board as, for 
example, in Table 5. For this example, if bidder 2 wanted contract 1 in the amount of 
(x, y) = (10, 3), he could do so by bidding (10, 3, 0). If 2, on the other hand, wanted (x , y) = (12, 6), 
2 would have to bid at least 201 (to bump 3). If 2 wanted (x ,y)  = (12, 11) , 2 would have to bid at
least 501 (to bump 7) and if 2 wanted (6,16), 2 must bid 701 (to bump both 3 and 7) . 
We chose this basic mechanism for several reasons: (1) the practical success of the single 
unit English auction as signaled by its widespread use, (2) the feeling, based on experimental 
experience, that in an environment in which the bases for common knowledge are little understood 
or controlled, iterations with commitment allow subjects to "feel their way" in a manner in which 
sealed-bid, one-shot auctions do not,22 and (3) a theoretical analysis of its properties. Let us briefly
expand on the last. 
We emphasize two facts about the A USM-Bulletin Board. First, given a proposed allocation 
any i can, with a high enough bid, change the proposed allocation to one in which i's  contract/ is 
for any amount less than or equal to y . Second, the proposed allocation puts a lower bound on how 
much i must bid in order to achieve any desired allocation on contract f . Let 'I/ represent a set of
contracts; a potential allocation. Let s1 ('J/) represent the set of contract allocations to which i can 
unilaterally cause 'I'* to be changed with some bid. We call 'I'* a simple equilibrium if \j/* is
feasible and if Vi = 1, . . .  , n ,  si ('I'*) n {\jl I Vi (\jl) > Vi (\jl*)} = 0, where Vi (\jl) represents the 
(expected) utility i receives if the potential allocation 'I' is actually provided. That is, no i can 
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unilaterally improve his position since any bid high enough to cause i's quantity di to be included in 
the allocation of contract f will be higher than the value of the benefits attained from those di units
of contract/. Simple equilibria are contract allocations which are individually "stationary" 
allocations of AUSM. This is a fairly big set, not all of which are desirable. Further, we feel that 
reasonably well informed traders will be able to avoid some of them. To see how, consider a slightly 
different mechanism. 
Suppose each i chooses a contract mi =(di, bi , f ). Given m =(mi . . . .  , m n  ), a potential 
allocation of contracts 'JI* (m ) is chosen as follows: for each f pick K1 to max . L bi subject to
1eK1 
L di � y . Then allocate to i the contract f in the amount of di, bi if i E K1 . One can think of
ieK1 
this as a game, G, with strategies m i  and outcome function 'I'* (m ), with allocations picked to
maximize the aggregate stated willingness to pay. It could be used as a "sealed bid" mechanism.
We call 'I'* a non-cooperative equilibrium allocation of G, if 'I'* ='JI* (m *) and for each i ,  
yi ('JI*) ;:::: yi ('JI* (m *Im i )  V m i ,  where (m *Im i) is the vector m * with m t replaced by m i . It is an
obvious fact that if 'JI* is a non-cooperative equilibrium allocation of G, then 'I'* is a simple
equilibrium of AUSM. The converse is not necessarily true. 
Based on previous experimental experience with games such as G , it would not be 
unreasonable to expect in experimental testing with replications that the final allocations would be 
non-cooperative equilibrium allocations of G . Not all simple equilibria will occur in replicated
situations when subjects can learn to avoid "bad" dynamics. Of course what the mechanism designer 
is really interested in is not the equilibrium but the efficiency of the equilib1ium allocations. 
Unfortunately, even if only non-cooperative equilibria of AUSM occur, the associated allocations 
may not be desirable. Because of the lumpy nature of the users' projects, there are non-cooperative 
equilibrium allocations of G which are not efficient contract allocations. There may be changes in 
those allocations involving several traders simultaneously which can make all better off. In 
particular, if, during the auction, there is a large user who is part of the current potential allocation 
and who has a fairly high bid, it may be too costly for any one small user to displace him even if it is 
possible that several small users can together receive more benefits than the single large user. In this 
situation unilateral actions by one user are not sufficient to drive the mechanism to a more efficient 
allocation of contracts. 23 
In our initial testing of the A USM-Bulletin Board, we had hoped that these complications 
caused by the variable size demands would be overcome by the subjects. But early data (reported in
detail below) suggested efficiency levels of only 75-85 percent. We therefore felt it important to try 
to overcome this limitation of the mechanism. To do so, we had to improve the ability of the 
mechanism to recognize when to replace one big user with two or more little users. Our solution 
was not only to allow small users to coordinate their bids but to encourage them to do so. We 
created a new mechanism by modifying AUSM in the following ways. A public "standby" queue 
was allowed in which any agent could post a "proposed bid" (di , bi , f )  which they would be willing
to have included in a coalitional bid. Because of the possibility of joint bids from a group y of
individual agents, we expected different outcomes with the queue than we had hypothesized would 
arise in A USM without the queue. 
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Let y � { 1 ,  . . .  , n } be an arbitrary coalition of agents and let (m *Im 'Y) be the vector m * 
with mt replaced by mi for all i E y. We call 'll a strong non-cooperative equilibrium of G if'll = 'I'* (m * ) and for each coalition y and each m 'Y t:. m * 'Y there is at least one i E y such that
yi ('I'* (m * )) > yi [\jl* (m *Im 'Y)]. If 'I'* is a strong non-cooperative equilibrium of G, then 'I'* is a
non-cooperative equilibrium of G. The converse is not necessarily true. 
Our hope was that offering the subjects the opportunity to "publicly" coordinate their bids 
through the queue would lead them to strong non-cooperative equilibria of the game G (if such 
equilibria existed). If that occurred, then this variation in the AUSM rules would solve our problem
since those equilibrium allocations of G are efficient. 
B. The Experiment 
As before, we created 2 markets (priority contracts) with 1 corresponding to A in Figure 1 
and 2 corresponding to B. When the market opened subjects would submit an order consisting of a 
market or the standby queue, an x and y choice, and a bid. Their order would be accepted if it could 
fit within the available capacity of the market requested, if it could displace existing orders with 
lower bids, or if the standby queue were requested. If a subject wanted to use the standby queue he 
had to indicate for which market the bid was tendered. Furthermore, if a subject's bid in the standby 
queue were combined with another order, then any standing order the subject had in a market was 
canceled. Finally, to aid in the search process for the best configurations, subjects were allowed to 
move existing configurations to other markets and/or change their configuration and bid if it could fit 
in the available capacity. However, if a subject did change his configuration in a market he had to 
improve the bid of the total orders he was displacing including (if necessary) his original order. For 
example, suppose the orders in market 1 were as follows: 
Market 1 
Subject x y Bid
2 12 9 150 
4 5 4 100 
5 3 6 75 
If subject 2 wanted to change his configuration to x = 12, y = 13 he would have to bid more than 
225. The bid improvement increment was set at 5. If an order was displaced the subject was allowed 
to reorder through the process above and submit any feasible order he or she wanted. The auction 
stopped when there were no new orders or order changes within 30 seconds of the last order. When 
the market closed a die was rolled. Based on the data in Table 2,  if the number 1 through 5 appeared 
the orders in market 1 were filled. If the numbers 1 or 2 appeared the orders in market 2 were filled. 
If an order was filled the subject was given his redemption value minus his bid. If a subject's order
was not filled his bid was subtracted from his accumulated earnings. If a subject did not have an 
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order in a market the subject received zero earnings for the market period. At  the beginning of the 
experiment each subject was given 7 dollars of working capital to add to his earnings since losses in 
any market period were possible.24
The AUSM mechanism without a queue was also tested. The instructions for both AUSM 
mechanisms can be found in Appendix B .  
C. The Result 
AUSM operated smoothly. When run with a queue it outperformed Markets, the 
Administrative Processes, and the Iterative Vickrey-Groves mechanism. The mean efficiency was 
8 1  percent with a range from 72 percent to 86 percent. AUSM with queue dominated all others each 
day. Two other interesting facts were (1) the small variance in the levels of efficiency achieved and 
(2) the high revenue collected. 
While AUSM yielded more efficient allocations than the others, it also did not reach 100 
percent and, in fact, never even got to 90 percent. However, it is important to realize that the 
experimental environment made it pa1ticularly difficult to better 85 percent. There are few 
configurations (see Figure 2) which generate efficiencies higher than 85 percent and those that do are 
very sensitive to the decisions of a single participant. Conversely it is easy to achieve efficiencies 
below 70 percent. Thus, both IVG and AUSM systematically found low probability but high 
efficiency allocations. 
We now tum to a more detailed analysis of the performance of each mechanism in the 
experimental test-bed. We then conclude with some final observations. 
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we provide the details that support our earlier observations. We measure 
three aspects of mechanism performance: efficiency, revenue, and individual behavior. The overall 
performance of the mechanisms is determined by using the risk-neutral expected values of (ex ante) 
efficiency. This does not necessarily measure the ex ante efficiency of the mechanisms since it does 
not account for the risk preferences of the subjects; nevertheless, it does measure the ex ante system 
perf01mance from the point of view of a risk-neutral planner. We also consider the extent to which 
revenue is generated by each mechanism. Finally, we evaluate the data to see whether we can learn 
anything about individual behavior. 
Table 6 contains relevant information describing each experimental session. 
A. Efficiency 
The mean efficiency (percent of the maximum expected value (µ)) and the associated 
standard deviation (cr) and coefficient of variation (v) for each mechanism can be found in Table 7.
The nature of the underlying distribution of combinations found in Figure 2 suggests the use of 
nonparametric methods for our statistical analysis. We will use the Wilcoxon Rank Sum to test the 
equality of distributions of efficiency generated by each mechanism. In particular the z scores to be 
reported are derived from testing the hypothesis of equality of distributions versus strict inequality of 
distributions. The Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test for each mechanism are in Table 8. We have pooled 
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the data from each experiment. While this affords more degrees of freedom we may be biasing 
results if substantial learning occurs in a mechanism. Our statistical measures in Table 8 support the 
following ranking of the mechanisms by efficiency as follows: 
I M =AP =A < IG = AUSM < AUSMQ I 
The mean efficiency per period for each mechanism can be found in Figure 3. We notice 
that for the Administrative mechanism and markets the level of efficiency tends to increase over 
time. In particular, the mean and standard deviation of efficiency for periods 3 and above is 69 .4 and 
5.4 for Administrative, and markets have a mean and standard deviation of 73 and 6.7 respectively. 
Thus, we see that efficiency increases with repetition in the Administrative Process and Markets. 
Further, the reduction in the standard deviation in the later periods suggests that these higher 
efficiencies will be maintained. For AUSM with and without a queue and for IVG, there is no 
significant effect of repetition. The mean efficiency for periods 1 and 2 was 77 . 1  for A USM, 81 .  6 
for AUSMQ, and 76.8  for IVG, while the mean efficiency for periods 3 and above was 78.1 for 
AUSM, 80.2 for AUSMQ, and 78.6 for IVG. The Administrative Process with nonzero price shows 
a decrease over time with a mean efficiency of 63.3 and standard deviation of 5.8 for periods 3 and 
above. These observations on learning strengthen our statistical results on efficiency from the 
pooled samples. 
Since the inefficiency of markets may surprise some, let us look more closely at the data on 
market prices. Recall that our experimental design creates a condition in which there is no 
competitive equilibrium. One might still hope that prices could still stabilize in the markets. The 
mean and 95 percent confidence intervals for each market/period are in Table 15. Three 
observations can be made: (1) contract prices decrease over time and tend to equate across product 
dimensions (X and Y) for each contract, (2) variance in contract prices falls over time, but is still 
high, and (3) the lowest probability (116) state markets (5 and 6) command higher mean prices than 
that of markets 3 and 4 (113 probability). Although this last observation is curious, notice that 
markets 1 and 2 combined with 5 and 6 makeup a priority contract. Subjects may simply be trying 
to form such contracts. The main conclusion we draw is that prices are not behaving as they do 
when equilibria exist. They are not able to smooth out non-convexities. 
B. Revenue 
AUSM with a queue is more efficient than AUSM without a queue. Counteracting this 
advantage of the queue is the possibility that agents will form "coalitions" via the standby queue and 
reduce the revenue. Data on the mean revenue (total and by market) for each treatment, and the 
associated standard deviation and coefficient of variation are shown in Tables 9 and 10. The 
histogram of the overall revenue generated from the processes is in Figure 4. Very little revenue is 
generated in AP since most of the requests (77 percent) were for non-paying status. From Table 9 
we see that the addition of the standby queue to A USM results in a higher mean revenue and a shift 
in the support to the right. If we look at the revenue generated market by market we see that with a 
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queue, the volatility of revenue is fairly low for market 1 and high for market 2. Without a queue, 
revenue from each market is relatively volatile. Of course, market 1 contracts received higher bids. 
Specifically, market 2 contracts have a mean bid 1/3 that of market 1 contracts (approximately the 
difference in probability of each market being filled). Table 1 1  supplies the rank sum and t tests for 
the overall revenue generated by each of the AUSM and IVG treatments, while Table 12 provides 
these same tests for each of the markets. 
We see that the existence of the standby queue results in significantly higher revenues and 
this comes from higher revenue generated in both markets 1 and 2. The mean for periods 1 and 2 
and periods 3+ for each mechanism and the relevant statistical tests are provided in Tables 13  and 
1 4. We notice a slight upward trend in the revenue in both AUSM and IVG which is traceable to the 
revenue generated in market 1 .  No such trend is found by examining the time series for AUSM with 
a queue. We also notice that the revenue generated by IVG is quite volatile. 
C. Individual Choice Behavior 
Adm inistrative Process. As detailed in Section IV, we would expect the Administrative Process to
generate choices which are consistent with "scaled down" projects. Specifically, from the 
redemption value sheets in Appendix A, notice that if each individual chose the largest project only 
one order would fit per market. However, if each subject chose his smallest project everyone could 
fit in one of the markets. Actual orders balanced between these extremes. Out of the 102 orders 
filled in the Administrative Process, only six orders submitted were an individual's smallest project 
while only nine orders had the largest project submitted. The average sizes (X , Y) submitted by 
subjects over time are in Table 16. This table provides evidence of an updating phenomena on the 
part of the subjects. As a final note, the ranking of m arkets by probability (see Section V) was never 
violated by a subject in the experim ents. 
AUSM. While we did not design the experiments to test whether the three equilibrium concepts used 
in Section VI A were consistent with reality, some evidence can be extracted from the data. In a 
strict sense, all three are rejected. None of the 20 allocations achieved by AUSM were even simple 
equilibria much less non-cooperative or strong non-cooperative. Only 4 of the 20 allocations chosen 
by A USM with queue were simple equilibria. Some of this might be explained by risk-averse 
behavior, but we feel that risk is not that important in this environment. 
A better insight can be gained by examining which agents were following best-response 
strategies when the auction closed. Individuals in market 1 are almost always (58 out of 59) best 
responding. 27 percent (15/56) of the non-best responses come from subjects in market 2 for AUSM 
and 33 percent (1 1/33) in AUSM with queue. These facts suggest subjects may be "standing pat" in 
market 2. Most, almost 70 percent, of the non-best responses are from subjects who are not yet 
allocated space in any market. These data lead us to conclude, albeit tentatively, that non­
cooperative equilibrium allocations of the full-information game are likely to occur in AUSM, 
especially if the stakes were to be increased. Over 80 percent of the responses are within 10¢ of the 
theoretical best-response. Aggressive behavior, competitive pressures, and the iterative nature of the 
process with commitment all seem to help lead to stationary allocations that look like 
Cournot-Nash, full information, non-cooperative equilibria. 
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Iterative Vickrey-Groves. We were especially interested in two aspects of individual behavior in the 
IVG mechanism: (1) whether individuals bid their expected value (was it demand revealing?), and 
(2) whether there were any discernable "strategic" bids made during a market period. Many of the 
bids made during a market period were above expected values ( 40 percent of the bids) and this was 
even true on the last trial in a period (3 1 percent of the bids). This behavior did lead some 
individuals employing those bids to pay more than their value to get a contract. Those making such 
a loss (or after obtaining prices above expected values) generally did not repeat this bidding 
behavior. 
Two particular aspects of strategic behavior employed by subjects involved attempts to gain 
information about other individuals' bidding behavior. First, some participants would bid zero to see 
what their price would be and so had no effect on the prices of individuals who were provisionally 
selected. Second, the participants typically used all of the possible trials, leaving resources to be 
allocated in a one-shot game in the final trial, (85 percent of the time for market 1 and 75 percent of 
the time for market 2). In order to see if the number of trials makes a difference in the efficiency of 
the mechanism, we conducted an experiment with 40 trials. For the first period the efficiency was 
75.5 percent and revenue was 250; the second period concluded with 78 percent efficiency and 495 
for revenue. Both periods used all 40 trials. 
Markets. Even though there were only six participants in the experiment trading in the markets was
very active. 2 5 However, the trading patterns over the course of an experiment were not entirely 
stable. That is, individuals did not choose the same projects and use the same contracts in each 
period. We call this phenomena market switching. As evidence of this market switching we noticed 
very few subjects (28 percent) stayed with the same contract across periods; 60 percent of the 
subjects that did selected no contracts (they sold their endowments). However, 17 percent of the 
subjects switched markets at least once and 56 percent switched at least twice in the last four 
periods. This evidence is consistent with the fact that there was no stable set of prices to coordinate 
allocations in our market experiments. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have designed and analyzed six different mechanisms for solving a resource 
allocation problem in an environment similar to many scheduling applications. The two key 
characteristics of the environment are that demands are lumpy and ill-fitting and that supply is 
uncertain and unresponsive at the time of contracting. The mechanisms analyzed included markets 
and an administrative process, as representatives of institutions which have naturally evolved, and 
two newly designed mechanisms, the Iterative Vickrey-Groves mechanism and AUSM. 
The experimental results show that simply setting up enough markets is not the best way to 
proceed if the environment is characterized by significant indivisibilities and, a fortiori, non­
convexities. In the experimental test-bed, markets performed no better than an ad hoc administrative 
process. Both mechanisms, modeled on naturally evolved institutions, yielded low efficiency levels. 
Two new designed institutions AUSM and IVG, using priority contracts were created and 
analyzed as alternatives to markets and administrative processes. Both significantly outperformed 
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markets in the testbed, especially in the early periods when there i s  no information and no basis for 
common knowledge priors. This is an especially important consideration for non-repeatable 
operations such as the Space Station. Neither could consistently generate efficiencies greater than 85 
percent in the demanding experimental environment. 
Designing mechanisms for applications, as in designing America's Cup sailboats or 
airplanes like the Shuttle, is an artform to be guided by theoretical developments and experience. 
Our use of experimental methods has allowed us to accumulate some experience prior to the 
application. Several observations based on that experience deserve mention. First, the transparency 
of a mechanism-the ease with which an agent is able to anticipate the results of any particular 
strategy-is important in achieving more efficient allocations earlier. Market prices in these 
environments, in early periods, were unpredictable causing inefficient resource purchases. The 
Administrative Process is simple-minded but there was so much randomness subjects had difficulty 
coordinating designs. The IVG process is "obscure"; subjects were unsure what "prices" would be. 
Only AUSM was straight-forward and stable. Second, while tatonnement-like iterations without 
commitment may guide coordination (it is a form of "cheap-talk"), our experience shows that some 
commitment is desirable to stabilize responses and to speed convergence. Iteration allows feedback, 
reaction, and learning about the possibilities. In the Administrative Process in early periods subjects 
have to submit designs, knowing nothing about their environment. The results were very low 
efficiencies .  AUSM allows early mistaken guesses about what would fit, etc. to be changed in 
response to "tentative" allocations. Of course if there is no commitment the information generated 
by iteration would be useless. Thus mechanisms need a delicate balance between commitment 
without an ability to adjust (as in the Administrative Process) and adjustment without the ability to 
commit (as in IVG). AUSM works because it attains such a balance. Third, markets cannot smooth 
over all non-convexities, especially in environments with little prior information. (In our 
environment, markets exhibited the worst performance on day 1-worse than first-come first­
served.) Eventually, as a common basis for "rational expectations" emerges, the performance of 
markets improves but never reaches that of the newly designed mechanisms. In the theoretical 
analysis of mechanisms, the assumption that there are objective common knowledge priors obscures 
this type of consideration.26
This study is part of a larger study to help NASA develop appropriate mechanisms to 
allocate its Space Station resources among a variety of diverse users. Indeed, the results contained in 
this study have already lead to the development of a vastly more elaborate experimental environment 
(testbed) to demonstrate the feasibility and performance of various allocation mechanisms27 (see
Plott and Porter (1988)). There are other modifications of the environment that would bring the 
test-bed into closer congruence with the Space Station problem. For example it would increase 
realism by inducing the preferences of some or all of the users to be a function of the time at which 
they are allocated resources. This would model better the importance of phenomena like "launch 
windows" in the timing in Figure 1 .  Adding a time dimension to user preferences would also 
highlight the need for an analysis of contingent and futures contracting in allocating resources. 
Being first would no longer necessarily be better. This modification would allow a meaningful 
comparison of mechanisms across contract types, as well as contract types across mechanisms. 
Another change in the environment would alter the subjects ' problems to correspond more closely to 
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that of a NASA engineer and less that of a profit-maximizing firm. In particular, the payload 
selection process (including budgeting, peer review, and project management) might be better
modeled with budget constraints on designs and payoffs for scientific benefits rather than with net 
benefits as we have done in this paper.28 A fundamental change would be to allow supply to be
endogenous. This significantly alters the structure of the problem and may raise problems which 
neither AUSM nor IVG can handle effectively.29
The fundamental open question is, of course, whether or not there exist other allocation 
mechanisms which outperform those analyzed. There are "optimal auctions," designed to attack 
incentive difficulties in simpler problems, that abstract from the more ugly parts of our environment 
but which might nevertheless be adaptable. Examples can be found in Harris-Raviv (198 1). Chao 
and Wilson (1987, p. 914) identify institutions for implementing priority pricing when there are no 
indivisibilities. See also Reitman (1985) and Pitblado (1987). There are algorithms from 
combinatorial optimization, designed to attack informational difficulties in even more complex 
problems, which ignore incentive issues but which might be adaptable in any case. Examples can be 
found in French (1982) Kirkpatrick, Gelatt and Vecchi (1983) Reiter (1966) Reiter and Sherman 
(1962) and Ressenti, Smith and Bulfin (1982). AUSM and IVG combine features of each of these 
approaches. Unanswered is whether there are other mixtures which are better. 
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APPENDIX A 
REDEMPTION VALUE SHEETS AND SCREEN DISPLAY 
2 4  
Va lua t ion She e t  1 Valua t i on She e t  2 
I y 3 9 13  I y 6 10 14 
I X I X  
I I 
I 4 100 150 175 I 3 1 2 5  150 1 7 5  
I I 
I I 
I 7 1 7 5  2 2 5  250 I 9 1 7 5  190 200 
I I 
I I 
I 12 2 5 0  3 2 5  3 3 5  I 1 5  200 2 2 5  2 5 0  
I I 
Valuat ion Shee t  3 Valuat i on She e t  4 
I y 2 4 9 I y 8 10 12 
I X I 
I I 
I 3 7 5  100 1 2 5  I 6 100 150 2 00 
I I 
I I 
I 5 100 200 2 2 5  I 8 150 200 2 7 5  
I I 
I I 
I 12 1 7 5  2 5 0  2 7 5  I 1 2  1 7 5  250 300 
I I 
Valua t i on Sheet 5 Valuat ion She e t  6 
I y 7 1 0  1 3  I y 7 9 11 
I X I X  
I I 
I 6 1 7 5  2 2 5  2 5 0  I 7 7 5  150 175 
I I 
I I 
I 9 2 2 5  2 7 5  300 I 9 1 2 5  1 7 5  200 
I I 
I I 







{ This p ortion is the same for all mechanisms } 
You are about to partic ipate in an experiment des igned to provide 
ins ight into certain features of decis ion proces s es . If you follow the 
ins tructions carefully and make good decisions , you might earn a cons iderable 
amount of money . You will be paid in cash . 
In this experiment we are go ing to conduct a market in which you wi ll 
make deci s ions which will be used to determine the market outcomes . You will 
be given a Redemption Value Sheet , which describes the value to you of the 
decis ions you might make . You are not to reveal this  information to anyone . 
I t  is  your own private information . 
The type of currency used in this market is francs . All transactions 
wil l  be in terms of francs . Each franc is worth ___ dollars to you . Do not 
reveal this  number to anyone . At the end of the experiment your francs will 
be converted into dollars at this rate , and you will be paid in do llars . 
On your Redemption Value Sheet you have one proj ect which has 9 possible 
X and Y configurations assoc iated with it along wi th a redemp tion value
s tated in francs . Suppose for examp le that your Redemption Value Sheet were 
as follows : 
I Y I 3 6 12  
l _X_ I 
I I 
I 5 I 100 200 300 
I I 
I I 
I 10 I 200 400 500 
I I 
I I 
I 15 I 300 450 550 
I I 
Then for your proj ect with the configuration X=5 and Y=l 2 , you would have 
a redemption value of 300 francs ; for your proj ect with configuration X=lO 
and Y=6 you would have a redemp tion value of 400 francs . 
Wi thin each market period there will be a total of __ markets with a 
fixed capac i ty of 20  units of X and 20 units of Y in each market to be
allocated to participants . Your amount of X and Y and the earnings you will
receive will be determined us ing the following proces s . 
{ Fo r  the I terative Groves mechanism we us ed}  
All communication during the market period will conduc ted through your 
computer terminal . The exper iment will cons ist  of several market periods . 
Each market period wi ll be composed of trials in which you will submit an 
order . An order cons ists of a configuration , a market ,  and a bid for the 
market ,  You can submit an order during a trial by following the instruct ion 
prompts on your computer screen . The firs t promp t will  ask you for a 
configuration o f  X and Y .  You mus t then enter one of  your 9 choices , Next you
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will be asked i f  you want t o  enter a bid for market l ;  i f  you answer yes (y) , 
you will be asked for your bid in francs . If  you answer no (n) , i t  will 
proceed to market 2 and ask you if you would l ike to bid . Thus , for a trial 
in a market per iod you cannot s imultaneous ly have a bid in markets 1 and 2 .  
EXAMPLE 
Enter quantity of X des ired : Z 
Enter quantity of Y des ired : 1 2  
D o  you want t o  order in market l?  n 
Do you want to order in market 2 ?  y 
Enter bid in market 2 :  150 
Do you confirm X = 7 Y = 1 2  Bl = 0 B2 = 150 ? y 
Thus , in this example a b id of 150 francs was placed in market 2 for the 
configuration X=7 and Y=12 . The only restriction you have on the bids you 
submit for a market dur ing a period is that i t  be greater than or equal to 
zero . After each participant has placed an order during a trial , a set of 
provis ional configurations wi l l  be selected for each market by finding the 
larges t  sum of bids submitted for that market for which the sum of the 
corresponding configurations do not exceed the capac i ty constraints (X 20 , 
Y = 2 0 ) . Each individual will then be given the information as to which 
participants are provis ionally selected in each market and their 
configurations . In addition , each participant will  rece ive a price for each 
market . If you are one of the partic ipants that are provis ionally selected in 
a market ,  your price will  be calculated as follows : 
[ Maximum of the sum of bids (without your bid) submitted for that market for 
which the corresponding total configurations (without your configuration) 
does not violate the capacity cons traint ] -
( Sum of bids ( excluding your b id) of the provisional configurations ] 
I f  your configuration is  not one of the provis ional configurations in a 
market ,  then you will receive a price which indicates the minimum bid you 
could have submitted in that market and have had your order be one of the 
provis ional configurations in that market .  
EXAMPLE 
Market 2 
Participant x x Bid Price 
*l 10 10 200 160  
2 1 5  1 0  160 200 
3 10 1 5  170  350  
*4 5 10  150 0 
6 1 1  5 100 200 
In this  example , we see that participants 1 and 4 have provis ional 
configurations in this  market because their combined reque s ts of X=15  and 
Y=20 do not violate the capac i ty cons traints , and the ir sum of bids of 3 50  
francs is  the large s t  such sum . The price for partic ipant 1 was calculated 
by : ( 3 10 ] - ( 15 0 ] = 160  as per the equation above . S imilarly , the price for 
participant 4 was calculated by : ( 200 ] - ( 200 ] = 0 .  Notice that in either 
case the price does not depend on the participant ' s  b id .  
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For an individual who is no t in the provis ional configuration in this 
example , such as participant 3 ,  we see that to be in the provis ional set 
he/she mus t  b i d  350  francs s ince the configuration he/she submitted cannot 
fit with any o ther order . 
The provisional configurations in the markets will obtain their 
allocations if the s ame participants and configurations occur for �­
s traight trials (Rule A) , or the trials in the market period are exhaus ted . 
A to tal o f  �- trials for each market period will be allowed . Market 1 will 
close after trials , and market 2 after additional tr ials . That is , 
if  Rule A is not activated after �- trials the provisional allocations in 
market 1 wi ll  be chosen ,  and after trials the orders in market 2 will  be 
chosen .  After the process s tops in a period by e i ther of  the conditions a die 
will be rolled . If the numbers ��- through �� appear the orders in market 
1 will b e  filled . If  the numbers through �� appear the orders in 
market 2 will be filled . 
Each participant has been given ��- francs of  working capital . To 
determine your costs for the market period , sum up your prices in those 
markets for which you have obtained an allocation at the market close . If 
your order is filled , then your earnings will be equal to your redemption 
value minus your costs . If your order is not fil led , you mus t sub tract your 
costs from your working cap i tal . If you do not obtain an allocation in a 
market for the period , you will rece ive zero earnings for the period . You 
should record your earnings on your Record of  Earnings sheet located in the 
b ack of your folder . At the beginning of a market period you will  be 
ass i gned a new Redemp tion Value Sheet from which to make your dec isions . The 
Redemption Value Sheet will  no t be the same for all partic ipants . Feel free 
to earn as much as you can . Are there any questions ? 
{ For the ASUM - Bulletin Board with Queue we used}  
When the market opens you will  be able to submit an order cons isting of 
a market or the S tandby Queue , a configuration , and a b id in francs . Orders 
wil l  be taken one at a time and posted on the board . You can submit an order 
by rais ing your hand and after you are identified , you can submit one order . 
Your order wil l  be accepted if : 
a)  I t  can fit in the availab le capacity of the market 
reque s ted , or 
b )  It can displace existing orders with lower b ids , or 
c )  The S tandby Queue is reques ted . 
I f  p lace an order in the Standby Queue you mus t  also identify the market 
for which the o rder is to be p laced on standby . However , you can have only 
one order in the markets at any one time . Thus , you can have an order in 
Market 1 or 2 but not both Markets 1 and 2 s imultaneous ly . You can have as 
many orders as you want in the S tandby Queue . 
Suppose for example , that the fixed capacity was X = 20 and Y = 20 , and
there were 2 markets , and the exis ting orders , none of which are yours , were 
as fol l ows : 
Ava i lab le 
Capac i ty 
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Market 1 Market 2 S tandby Queue 
x y Bid x y Bid x y Bid Market
1 1  9 1100 7 5 500 5 5 400 1 
5 7 1000 
4 4 1 3  1 5  
I f  you want to submit an order that has quantities X = 4 and Y = 6 ,  you
can order space in Market 2 or the Standby Queue and submi t any nonnegative 
bid ,  or you can order space in Market 1 and displace the X = 5 and Y = 7
order with a bid greater than 1000 francs . Furthermore you can combine your 
bids with orders in the S tandby Queue that were not submitted by you to 
disp l ace exi s ting orders in Markets 1 and 2 if the entire order can fit and 
the total bid is greater than the total displaced orders b ids . For example , 
you could have made a bid greater than 6 0 0  francs and combined that with the 
exis t ing 400 franc bid in the S tandby Queue and disp lace the X = 5 and Y = 7 
order in Market 1 s ince you both can fi t .  In the event that more than one
exi s t ing order can be displaced by your b id the order with the lowest  bid 
will be the one displaced . If one of your orders in the S tandby Queue is  
comb ined with another order , then any order you have standing in a market is  
canceled . 
I f  you have an order in a market you can change it  only if you increase 
your b id . If  you increase your bid you can :  
a )  Move your configuration to another market i f  you can fit o r  displace 
orders with lower bids and/or 
b )  Change your configuration if it  fits . However ,  if you do no t move 
your configuration to another market you mus t  place a bid higher than the 
orders you are displacing including your S tanding Order .
Your bid change mus t  be greater than francs to be accepted . Once 
you have an o rder in a market you cannot wi thdraw it . However ,  you can 
withdraw orders from the standby queue . 
In the event that your order is displaced you can reorder through the 
process  de scribed above . The process wi ll  s top when there are no new orders 
or order changes ( increased bids ) within seconds of the las t order 
submitted . The orders left standing on the board in Markets 1 and 2 when the 
proces s  s tops are the only orders that can be fi lled . However ,  there is a 
chance that the orders at the market close will  not be filled . After the 
proces s  s tops a die will be rolled . The orders in Market 1 will be filled if  
any of  the numbers ��- through appear . The orders in Market 2 will 
be filled if any o f  the numbers through appear . 
Each participant has been given francs of working cap ital . If  
your order is  filled your earnings will be equal to your redemption value 
minus your b id .  I f  your o rder is not accepted you mus t  subtract your bid from 
your working capital . I f  you did no t get in a market you will rece ive zero 
earnings for the market period . You should record your earnings on your 
Record of  Earnings Sheet located in the back of  your folder . Your earnings 
plus your remaining working capital are yours to keep . At the beginning of a 
market period you will be as signed a new Redemption Value Sheet from which to 
make your decis ions . The Redemption Value Sheet wi ll  not be the same for all 
partic ipants . Feel free to earn as much as you can . Are there any questions ? 
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{ For the AUSM-Bul letin Board we us ed)  
When the market opens you will  be  able to submit an order cons isting of 
a market ,  a configuration , and a bid in francs . Orders will  be taken one at 
a time and pos ted on the board .  You c an submit an order by rais ing your hand 
and after you are identifie d ,  you can submit one order . Your order wi ll  be 
accepted if : 
a )  I t  can fit in the available capac ity of the market 
requested , or 
b )  I t  can displace existing orders with lower bids . 
However , you can only have .Q!lg order s tanding on the board at any one time . 
Thus you can have an order in Market 1 or 2 but both Markets 1 and 2 
s imultaneously . 
For example , suppose the fixed capac i ty was X = 2 0  and Y 20 , and
there were two markets , and the existing orders none of which are yours were 
as fol l ows : 
Market 1 Market 2 
x y Bid x y Bid 
1 0  9 1100 7 5 5 0 0  
5 7 1000 
Available 4 4 1 3  1 5  
Capaci ty 
I f  you want to submit an order that has quantities X = 4 and Y = 6 you
can e i ther o rder space in Market 2 and submit any nonnegative bid ,  or you 
can order space in Market 1 and displace the X = 5 ,  Y = 7 order with a bid
greater than 1000 francs . In the event that more than one exis t ing order can 
be displ aced by your bid the order with the lowest  bid wil l  be the one 
disp laced .  
I f  you have an order standing on the board you can change i t  only i f  
you increase your bid . If  you increase your b i d  you can :  
a )  Move your configuration to another market i f  you can fit 
and/or 
b)  Change your configuration if it fits . However , i f  you do not move 
your configuration to another market you mus t  place a bid higher than than 
the orders you are displacing including your s tanding order . Your bid change 
must be greater than francs to be accepted . Once you have an order in 
a market you cannot withdraw i t . 
In the event that your order is displaced you can reorder through the 
process described above . The process will s top when there are no new orders 
or order changes  ( increased bids ) within seconds of  the las t order 
submitted . The o rders left standing on the board in Markets 1 and 2 when the 
process s tops are the only orders that can be fi lled . However , there is a 
chance that the orders at the market close wi ll  not be filled . After the 
process  s tops a die will be rolled . The orders in Market 1 will  be filled if  
any of  the numbers ��- through appear . The orders in Market 2 will 
be filled if any of the numbers through appear . 
Each partic ipant has been given francs of working capi tal . If  
your order is filled your earnings wil l  be  equal to  your redemption value 
minus your bid . If your order is not accepted you' mus t subtract your bid from 
your working cap ital . If you did not get in a market you wi ll  receive zero 
earnings for the market period . You should record your earnings on your 
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Record o f  Earnings Sheet located in the back o f  your fo lder . Your earnings 
p lus your remaining working cap i tal are yours to keep . 
At the beg inning of a market period you will be a s s igned a new 
Redemp t i on Value Sheet from wh ich to make your dec i s i ons . The redemption 
value shee t  will not be the same for all partic ipants .  Feel free to earn as 
much as you can . Are there any que s t ions ? 
{ For the Random Proc e s s  we used } 
At the beginning of the market period you will s end in your order for an 
X and Y configurat ion you would l ike by submitting an order form , and a 
ranking of your prefe renc e s  for Marke ts 1 and 2 .  That i s , you canno t p l ace a 
pre ference ranking for Marke ts 1 and 2 s imul taneous ly . Order forms can be 
found in the back o f  your folder . To submit an order j us t p l ace your X and Y 
c onfi gurat i on found on your Redemp t i on Value Sheet on your o rder form w i th a 
ranking of the marke ts . For example , supp o s e  you want to place an order for a 
configuration on your redempt ion value sheet that quan t i t i e s  of X = 9 and Y = 
14 , and you wanted the market rankings 2 and 1 ,  then you would s end in an 




You c an subm i t  one order . 
After all the orders have been c o l lected we will randomly select the 
o rders and p l ace them in the firs t avai lab l e  market with c ap ac i ty availab l e
according to the ranking o n  the order form a s  they are drawn . After we have 
exhaus ted all the orders or the cap a c i ty in each market we will determine the 
orders that are fill ed by roll ing a die twice , I f  the numbers through 
appear on the firs t roll the orders in Market 1 will b e  fil led . I f  the 
numbers ��- through ��- appear then the o rde rs in market 2 will be 
f i l l e d . 
Your earnings for the market period will be equal to your redemption 
value i f  your order is fi lled , otherwise your earnings will be zero . You 
should enter earnings for the market period on your Record of Earnings She et . 
Your to tal earnings over all the market per iods are yours to keep . 
At the b e ginning o f  a market period you will be a s s igned a new 
Redemp t ion Value Sheet from whi ch to make your dec i s ions . The redemp t ion 
value sheet will no t be the s ame for all partic ipants . Fee l  free to earn as 
much as you can . Are the re any que s t i ons ? 
{ For the Random Pro c e s s  with Cont ingent Contrac ts we us ed } 
At the b e ginning of the market period you will s end in your order for an 
X and Y confi gurat ion you would l ike by submi tting an order form , and a 
ranking o f  your preferences for Marke ts 1 ,  2 ,  3 ,  1 and 3 ,  and 2 and 3 .  That 
i s , you cannot place a preference ranking for Markets 1 and 2 s imul tane ous ly . 
Order forms c an b e  found in the back of your fo lder . To submi t  an order j us t 
p lace your X and Y configuration found on your Re demp tion Value Sheet on your
o rder form with a ranking of the markets . For example , supp o s e  you want to
p lace an o rder for a configurat ion on your redemp t ion value sheet that 
quant i t i e s  of X = 9 and Y = 14 , and you wanted the marke t rankings 2 and 3 ,
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1 ,  3 ,  1 and 3 ,  and 2 ,  then you would s end i n  an orde r form with the fol lowing 




You can submi t one order . 
After all the orders have been c o l lected we will randomly s e l e c t  the 
orders and place them in the firs t avai lab le market w i th capac i ty avai l able 
acco rding to the ranking on the order form as they are drawn . After we have 
exhausted all the orders or the capac i ty in each market we will de termine the 
orders that are filled by rolling a die twice . If the numb ers through 
appear on the f i r s t  roll the o rders in Marke t 1 will be fil led . I f  the 
numb ers ��- through ��- app ear on the firs t roll and the numbers ��­
through ��- appear on the second r o l l  the orders in Markets 1 and 2 will b e  
f i l l e d . I f  the numbers through ��- appear on the firs t roll and the 
numbers through ��- appe ar on the s econd roll the orders in Market 3 
will be filled . 
Your earnings for the market period will be equal to your redemp t ion 
value i f  your o rder is filled , o therwi s e  your earnings will be zero . You 
should enter e arnings for the market period on your Record of Earnings Sheet . 
Your to tal earnings over all the marke t periods are yours to keep . 
At the beg inning o f  a market period you will be as s i gned a new 
Redemp t i on Value Shee t  from whi ch to make your dec i s i ons . The redemp t ion 
value she e t  will no t be the same for all part i c ipant s . Feel free to e arn as 




State DescriQtion SUQQly 
1 A launches, B launches f + f 
2 A launches, B delayed y 
3 A delayed, A launches y 
4 A delayed, A delayed 0 
TABLE 2 
Quantity of Probability of 








Contingent Allocation of A 
X = 20, Y = 20, capacity
Sheet X Y Value 
1 12 9 $3.25 
2 3 6 $1 .25 
3 5 4 $2.00 
20 19 $6.50 
Pt = 2/3
P2 = 112
Contingent Allocation of B 
X = 20, Y = 20, capacity
Sheet X Y Value 
4 8 12 $2.75 
5 12 7 $2.50 
20 19 $5.25 
Expected Value = (5/6)($6.50) + (1/3)(5.25) = $7. 17. 
34 
TABLE 4 
Market # 1 Unit of This Contract Provides 
1 1 unit of X in event 5 (A goes on date 1)
2 1 unit of Y in event 5
3 1 unit of X in event 1 (A goes on 1 ,  B goes on 2)
4 1 unit of Y in event 1
5 1 unit of X in event 3 (A goes on 2)
6 1 unit of Y in event 3
TABLE S 
Contract 1 Contract 2 
B idder x y bid Bidder x y 
7 2 10  500 1 15 2 
3 6 5 200 4 1 10 
5 4 8 
Supply 20 20 Supply 20 20 
















* PCC = Pasadena City College
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TABLE 6 




17 Caltech, PCC* 





















Efficiency by Mechanism 
Mechanism µ CJ v 
Administrative (A) 63.5 10.0 .16 
Markets (M) 66.4 10.2 .15 
Administrative 69.9 8.1 .12 
with Prices >0 (AP) 
Iterative Vickrey-Groves (IVG) 77.9 6.8 .09 
AUSM 77.7 4.1 .05 
A USM with Queue 80.8 4.0 .05 
TABLE 8•
Rank Sum Test (All Periods) 
IVG AUSM AUSMQ AP M 
A z = 4.39 z = 4.36 z = 4.72 z = 1 .8 1  z = .63 
a =  .000 a =  .000 a =  .000 a = .07 a = .53 
IVG z = -.004 z = 1 .58 z = 2.63 z = 3.45 
a =  .480 a =  .057 a =  .009 a =  .001 
AUSM z = 2.12 z = 2.65 z = 3.97 
a =  .017 a= .009 a =  .000 
AUSMQ z = 3.95 z = 4.68 
a =  .000 
AP z = 1 . 12 
• a indicates the level of significance for the test that the efficiency of
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TABLE 9 
Total Revenue Generated 
µ CJ v 
404.5 48.7 . 12 
475.7 52.0 . 1 1  
388.4 1 1 8.2 .30 
TABLE 10 





Market 1 Market 2 
µ CJ v Range µ CJ v 
302.2 52.9 . 1 8  [154, 365] 102.3 22.6 .22 
353.7 36.2 . 10 [300, 425] 122.0 27.5 .23 
284. 1 85. 1 .29 [ 160, 449] 108. 1 66.3 .61 
TABLE 1 1 * 
Rank Sum and t -Test for Overall Revenue Generated
AUSMQ IVG 
AUSM z = 3.69 t = 3.59 z = - .65 t = - .55
ex =  .00 ex =  .07 ex =  .25 ex =  .29 
AUSMQ z = - 2.85 t = - 2.95
ex =  .00 ex =  .00 
*ex indicates the level of significance for the test that
the revenue generated by the mechanism in the 
column equals that in the corresponding row. 
Range 
[70, 145] 
[75, 1 85] 
[00, 240] 
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TABLE 12* 
Rank Sum and t -Test in Priority Markets
Market 1 (AUSMQ) Market 2 (AUSMQ) 
AUSM z = 2.25 t = 2.48 z = 3.69 t = 4.45 
a =  .01 a = .01 a = .00 a = .00 
*a indicates the level of significance for the test
that the revenue generated by the mechanism in 





TABLE 13  
Mean Revenue 










t -Tests for Mean Revenue - Early vs Later Periods
AUSM 3+ AUSMQ 3+ IVG 1 and 2
AUSM 1 and 2 t = 2.65 t = 4.44 t = -.53 
a =  .01 a = .00 a = .30 
AUSM 3+ t = -2.68 t = -2. 13  
a = .00 a = .03 
AUSMQ 1 and 2 t = -2.29 I =  .35 t = -2.80 
a =  .01 a =  .36 a = .01 
AUSMQ 3+ t = 2.68 t = -3.65 
a =  .00 a = .00 
IVG 1 and 2
*a indicates the level of significance (one-sided) for the test that
the revenue generated by the mechanism in the column equals 
that in the corresponding row. 
IVG 3+ 
t = .93 
a =  . 18  
t = -.16  
a =  .43 
t = -1.07 
a. = . 1 5
t = -1.53 
a = .07 








* 1 Franc = 2 cents
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TABLE 15 
Mean and 95% Confidence Intervals
on Prices in Francs*
Periods 1-4 
µ (95%) 
8 .4 (7.6, 9.2) 
7.5 (6. 1 ,  8.9) 
5.3 (3.8 ,  6 .8) 
4 . 1  (3.0, 5.2) 
3.2 (2.3, 4. 1) 
4.2 (3.3, 5 . 1 )  
TABLE 16 
Average Project Size Submitted per Period 
Period Mean (X , Y) 
1 (9.4, 8.9) 
2 (8.5, 9.9) 
3 (7.7, 8 .3) 
4 (6.9, 6 .8) 
5 (8. 1 ,  8.7) 
Periods 5-8 
µ (95%) 
7.8 (7. 1 ,  8 .5) 
6. 1 (5.2, 7.0) 
2.6 ( 1 .9, 3.3) 
2.7 (2.0, 3.4) 
3.2 (2.5, 3.9) 
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1 .  This work was partially funded by Caltech and NASA-JPL. We thank them for their support. 
They are not responsible for the content. We thank Peter Gray and Mark Olson for computer 
programming assistance. We also thank Charles Plott, Jim Quirk and Stan Reiter for helpful 
insights and discussions. This paper represents a major revision of our earlier 1987 paper. Al
the material on markets is new as are some of the conclusions. 
2. See Banks, Ledyard and Porter (1985); and Fox and Quirk (1985) for details.
3. For a more extensive discussion of the Space Station allocation and decision-making problems,
see Ledyard (1986).
4. For example, in electric networks, new power plants can be fired up yielding responsive supply,
and demand uncertainties are probably uncorrelated - except for weather events such as heat
waves - and therefore, aggregate demand is predictable over time. Thus, only the
indivisibilities are serious (shipping power from A to B requires a combination of links on the
grid, some of which are no help without others).
5. Of course this regulation is  undoubtedly mostly designed to control pipe-line owners in
monopoly positions. But it is also used to coordinate demand-supply imbalances.
6. See Grether, Isaac, and Plott (1981).
7. See Appendix H of the Space Station Operations Task Force Panel 3 Report (1987) for a
detailed description of resource allocation in NASA programs including the STS.
8 . A natural alternative to  this performance standard would be the set of  ex post Pareto-optimal
allocations. This standard would require that, after observing the true state of the world, the
new information would not lead society to regret any previous allocation decision; there would
be no reallocation which could have made everyone better off even with the added advantage of
hindsight. Unfortunately, there are many examples of the type of environment we are
considering for which there are no (contingent) allocations which are both consistent with the
information structure in Figure 1 and are ex post Pareto-optimal. It is easy to construct
examples such that the ex post optimal allocation of A differs in states 1 and 2. Thus, one 
cannot choose an allocation contingent on event 5 which will be ex post optimal in all possible
branches from 5. For this reason we have chosen ex ante Pareto Optimality as the primary
perfmmance standard by which we will judge alternative allocation mechanisms.
9. Even so, it is easy to construct examples of market-like institutions and game structures in
which only pure strategy equilibria exist and in which the equilibria allocations are not optimal.
10. The rules impose a bid-ask improvement rule and provide for the public broadcast of the
standing bid-ask spread.
1 1 . If subjects are not risk-neutral, but have van-Neumann-Morgenstern utilities g i (m ) for money,
then if they choose design a i ,  receive resources xi , and pay b i ,  they have an induced expected 
utility of 
U*(a 1' , x i ,  b i) =  g i  [Mi (ai)  - b i ] (:re't' (a i , x: , e ))
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which is neither quasi-linear nor risk-neutral. The theory and measurement could be modified 
to adjust for nonrisk-neutral subjects but we chose not to do so since we wanted to concentrate 
on mechanism performance from the point of view of an unbiased, risk-neutral planner. 
Section VII contains data which suggests that assuming risk-neutral subjects was not at too 
much variance with reality. 
12. The a i choices confronting the subjects are designed to be similar in spirit to those faced by a
Space Station payload operator who must design an instrument and use some Station resources
to produce output.
13 . The Caltech computerized version was used which allows for up to 19 simultaneous markets.
For more information on this software see Johnson et. al. (1988).
14. We do not consider the uncertainty created by the incomplete information about others' payoff
sheets, since we want to show what happens even if there is a lot of common information.
15 . The calculation is tedious but can be done on a PC.
16 . We do not know whether the vector of efficient payloads is  the only equilibrium. We also do
not know whether or not there are other equilibrium joint payload designs (x 1 , • . •  , x6) that
yield higher efficiencies than this equilibrium.
17. If all agents viewed the mechanism as an incomplete information game and if they
independently (without interaction) agreed that G i = Gi (ai , 9i ) for all i and that
9 = (91, . . .  , 91) is distributed according to g (9) and that g (9) represents objective common
knowledge-that is the game is the same from all players ' points of view (see Harsanyi
(1967-8) and Harsanyi (1980)) for these points-then one could adapt the approach of
D'Apresmont and Gerard-Varet (1979) to balance the budget. We do not do this because we do
not think there is any basis upon which to identify an objective common knowledge prior g (·)
for the applications in which we are interested.
1 8 .  This point has been made by Hyeck (1945) Marshak (1972) and others. 
19 .  For example, see Smith (1980) or  Ferejohn, Forsythe, and Noll (1979). 
20. The rules used were developed in response to early testing. Initially we did not close the
markets sequentially; however, the process was pushed by the subjects to the last trial in most
instances (even with 40 trials) and since an individual could only bid for market 1 or 2 (not 
both) there was substantial excess supply at the close. Also, we had instituted a rule in the early
testing which required individuals to better their previous bids in the market they were
ordering. This rule caused individuals to be cautious in their bidding or "locked" them into
larger projects yielding low efficiency levels and so was eliminated.
21 .  One modification o f  the Iterative Vickrey-Groves mechanism, proposed by seminar participants 
at New York University, which might stabilize its performance and improve its efficiency, 
would be to allow the algorithm which computes prices and allocations to accumulate the data. 
That is, at each iteration all past bids would be used; more and more points on the demand
surfaces would come into play. In the limit (with oo iterations) one might achieve the full 
Vickrey-Groves scheme. This should be followed up. 
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22. Of course, if enough contingent bids could be submitted in a sealed-bid, it could mimic an 
iterative process, but in an info1mationally more complex manner.
23. If omitted users could replace just the marginal units of those users in the potential allocation,
then it would not be costly to bump part of a large user. To do this, however, users would have
to be allowed to express a bid for each unit they wish to buy, yielding an entirely different 
mechanism.
24. The queue was the only major design change we made in response to early testing. There were,
however, two other minor, but significant, variations in design which we chose in response to
experimental testing. Originally, we had a stopping rule that the auction would run for T
minutes and the allocation at T would be final. It had undesired effects. In the pilot
experiments, very little bidding occurred until T - e when a flurry of bids were presented.
Allocations were essentially random. This was easily solved by changing the rule to the more
traditional one in which the auction ends if no new bids occur after S seconds, where S is a
design choice. The other variation concerned the commitment entailed in placing an order in a
market. In one pilot experiment, we used the same ordering process as above, except that
subjects could remove existing orders and change bids up or down while in a market. There
was no queue, but combining to move to different markets was allowed. This had an effect
similar to the first stopping rule. Without commitment, nothing serious happened until T - e. 
We fixed this by revising the rules, by which bidding could be done, in a way which made each
bid a potentially binding contract. Further, an explicit improvement rule for bids was added.
Finally, in our initial design of the standby queue we allowed participants with orders in the
standby queue to veto proposals combining with their order. We abandoned this rule in favor of
committed bids in the queue when we found no vetos.
25. Recall that our participants were experienced with multiple markets and computerized bid and
ask procedures.
26. See Daughety and Forsythe (1987) for an initial attempt to use experimental methods to study
this issue.
27. In that more elaborate testbed, we induced more continuous demands and the existence of the
competitive equilibrium. AUSM produced efficiencies at the 80 percent level while markets
were 89 percent efficient (80 percent in early periods) and the administrative process was only 
60 percent efficient.
28. We would change the model in Section II as follows: Let B i be i 's budget as determined by
NASA and Congress and Wi (Zi ) be the utility for the scientific returns zi . Let zi = f (x i , a i )
be the scientific return from project a i if resources xi are used, and let c i (a i ) be the cost of
design and construction of project a i . Now let Ui (a i , xi , b i ) = MAX wi (Zi ) subject to
bi + c i (a i ) :::; B i , z i = f (x i , a i ), and a i e A i . This change in ui could be easily
accommodated in the experimental design.
29. One pilot experiment with A USM modified to allow users to buy and sell (by "buying" negative
amounts) never got off the ground. No feasible "trial allocation" ever occurred. If this result is
replicated, other mechanisms will be needed for situations with significant supply decisions.
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